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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 The case before us is a familiar one: a constitutional 
challenge to a city ordinance that Plaintiffs Colleen Reilly and 
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Becky Biter allege impermissibly restricts their right to 
protest in the vicinity of abortion clinics.1  In addition to 
challenging the ordinance, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary 
injunction to enjoin its enforcement, which was denied.  
Because the claims are still before the District Court, we need 
not review their merit.  However, we clarify the analysis 
needed in considering requests for preliminary injunctions, 
and thus we remand.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 The City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, issued an 
ordinance that prohibits persons to “knowingly congregate, 
patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending 20 feet from 
any portion of an entrance to, exit from, or driveway of a 
health care facility.”  Harrisburg, Pa. Mun. Code § 3-371.4A.  
The stated purpose of the ordinance is to “promote the health 
and welfare of [Harrisburg] residents and visitors to [its] 
health care facilities, as well as the health and welfare of 
those who may wish to voice their constitutionally protected 
speech outside of such health care facilities . . . .”  Id. § 3-
371.2C.  But for those exempted (e.g., police and employees 
of the health care facility), the ordinance “appl[ies] to all 
persons equally regardless of the intent of their conduct or the 
content of their speech.”  Id. § 3-371.4. 
 Plaintiffs are individuals purporting to provide 
“sidewalk counseling” to those entering abortion clinics by 
way of leafletting, prayer, and conversation in attempts to 
dissuade patients from getting abortions.  Plaintiffs argue that 
the ordinance creates unconstitutional “buffer zones” that 
render impossible their ability to engage effectively in 
                                                          
 1 Rosalie Gross was also a Plaintiff in the action 
below, but has voluntarily dismissed her claims without 
prejudice and does not join this appeal.  
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counseling.  They claim that the ordinance violates their First 
Amendment rights to speak freely, exercise their religion, and 
assemble, as well as their Fourteenth Amendment due process 
and equal protection rights.  As noted, they also sought a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the 
ordinance. 
 Plaintiffs made several facial and as-applied 
challenges to the ordinance, some dismissed by the District 
Court though most remain.  The Court determined that the 
ordinance was content-neutral because it did not define or 
regulate speech by subject-matter or purpose, and thus 
intermediate scrutiny applied.  Under this tier of scrutiny, the 
Court reasoned that it must accept as true (for the purposes of 
a motion to dismiss) Plaintiffs’ claims that the City did not 
consider less restrictive alternatives to the ordinance, and thus 
it allowed their claims to proceed to discovery.  However, in 
considering whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, the 
Court ruled that Plaintiffs did not bear their burden of 
demonstrating that they were likely to succeed on the merits, 
and for that reason alone it denied the temporary relief 
sought.   
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had federal question subject matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a).  We have 
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of a district court 
granting or denying a preliminary injunction per 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1).  “When reviewing a district court’s [denial] of a 
preliminary injunction, we review the court’s findings of fact 
for clear error, its conclusions of law de novo, and the 
ultimate decision . . . for an abuse of discretion.”  Bimbo 
Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 Plaintiffs request that we decide the merits of their 
attack on the constitutionality of the ordinance.  As those 
claims are still before the District Court, it should evaluate 
them in the first instance. 
 Thus we turn to the denial of Plaintiffs’ preliminary 
injunction request.  Because the Court did not provide a full 
analysis of whether to grant that request and misallocated the 
burden of demonstrating narrow tailoring, we remand for its 
further consideration.  To assist in that effort and to clear up 
confusion caused by opinions in our Court that are in tension, 
we clarify how the analysis should proceed.  
  A.  Standard for Preliminary Injunctions 
 Over four decades ago we held that to obtain a 
preliminary injunction the moving party must show as a 
prerequisite 
(1) a reasonable probability of eventual success 
in the litigation, and (2) that it will be 
irreparably injured . . . if relief is not granted . . 
.  . [In addition,] the district court, in 
considering whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction, should take into account, when they 
are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other 
interested persons from the grant or denial of 
the injunction, and (4) the public interest.   
Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, 
Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).  
This standard for preliminary equitable relief remains; we 
have repeated that a district court—in its sound discretion—
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should balance those four factors so long as the party seeking 
the injunction meets the threshold on the first two.  See, e.g., 
Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975) (“[W]hile 
the burden rests upon the moving party to make [the first] two 
requisite showings, the district court should take into account, 
when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other 
interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, 
and (4) the public interest.”) (quotation omitted); In re Arthur 
Treacher’s Franchisee Lit., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 
1982) (same) (quotation omitted)); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. 
of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990) (“In order to 
support a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show both a 
likelihood of success on the merits and a probability of 
irreparable harm.  Additionally, the district court should 
consider the effect of the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
on other interested persons and the public interest.” (citations 
omitted)); Campbell Soup Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 
90-91 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa 
Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A 
District Court . . . balances these four factors to determine if 
an injunction should issue.” (citation omitted)).2    
 We are aware there is an inconsistent line of cases 
within our Court holding that all four factors must be 
established by the movant and the “failure to establish any 
element in its favor renders a preliminary injunction 
inappropriate.”  See, e.g., Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson 
Pharms, Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014); NutraSweet 
Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 
1999).  As best we can tell, this conflicting standard began 
                                                          
 2  In the parallel stay-pending-appeal context, where the 
factors are the same as for the preliminary injunctions, we 
also follow the analytical path noted above. In re Revel AC, 
Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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with Opticians Association of America v. Independent 
Opticians of America, in which we held that a district court 
“must consider four factors” and that “[o]nly if the movant 
produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that 
all four factors favor preliminary relief should the injunction 
issue.”  920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations 
omitted).  The panel in that case purported to glean this 
standard from our holding in ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., in 
which we stated that the movant bears the burden of showing 
the stated factors.  809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation 
omitted).  ECRI in turn attributed its guiding principle to SI 
Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, where we specified that 
“[i]n considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a 
court must carefully weigh [the] four factors . . . .”  753 F.2d 
1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985).  Heisley was not out of line with 
our precedent that the factors are to be balanced so long as the 
first two factors (likelihood of success on the merits and 
irreparable harm) are satisfied.  Thus the conflicting line of 
cases and corresponding confusion in our Court appear to be 
the product of compounded subtle misinterpretations of our 
longstanding jurisprudence.  
 In our Court “the holding of a panel in a precedential 
opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  Thus, no 
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential 
opinion of a previous panel.  Court en banc consideration is 
required to do so.”  Policy of Avoiding Intra-circuit Conflict 
of Precedent, Internal Operating Procedures of the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals § 9.1; see, e.g., Kossler v. Crisanti, 
564 F.3d 181, 194 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Pardini v. 
Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Rivera, 365 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Our precedent in Transamerican Trailer was never overruled 
by a decision of this Court en banc, leaving no subsequent 
panel the discretion to rule otherwise absent a contrary ruling 
by the Supreme Court.   
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 We also are aware that, significantly later than this 
confusion arose, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] plaintiff 
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 
in the public interest.”  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  At first blush that statement would 
lend support to the divergent standard articulated in Opticians 
Association of America almost twenty years earlier.  But for 
four reasons we think Winter did not overrule our balancing-
of-the-factors standard.  
 First, the Supreme Court in Winter explained that “[i]n 
each case . . . courts must balance the competing claims of 
injury and must consider the effect on each party of the 
granting or withholding of the requested relief.”  Winter, 555 
U.S. at 24 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).  It 
concluded that “[a]n injunction is a matter of equitable 
discretion” that requires “the balance of equities.”  Id. at 32 
(emphasis added).  That is why Justice Ginsburg determined 
that the “Court has never rejected [the balancing] formulation, 
and [did] not believe it [did] so” in Winter.  Id. at 51 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 That reading of Winter comports with the Supreme 
Court’s following opinion on temporary equitable orders, 
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), decided in the same 
term just five months later (with both opinions written by 
Chief Justice Roberts).  There the Court explained that a 
district court must undertake “consideration of [the] four 
factors.”  Id. at 434.  “Once an applicant satisfies the first two 
factors, the traditional [equitable relief] inquiry calls for 
assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the 
public interest.”  Id. at 435.  Though Nken dealt with the 
issuance of a stay pending appeal, the Court explained that 
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the same factors apply as in the preliminary injunction 
context “not because the two are one and the same, but 
because similar concerns arise whenever a court order may 
allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that 
action has been conclusively determined.”  Id. at 434.  Read 
together, these companion cases promote the traditional 
flexibility to granting interim equitable relief in which the 
district court has full discretion to balance the four factors 
once gateway thresholds are met.  See id.; Winter, 555 U.S. at 
32. 
 Second, other circuits have agreed with our reading of 
Winter and Nken.  For instance, the Seventh Circuit, citing 
Winter, has held that a preliminary injunction may issue if the 
movant demonstrates it will face irreparable harm and has a 
“plausible claim on the merits,” after which “the ‘balance of 
equities’ favors” the movant.  Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. 
Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 
(7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, C.J.).  “How strong a claim on 
the merits is enough depends on the balance of the harms: the 
more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the 
plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still supporting 
some preliminary relief.”  Id.  Similarly, citing Winter, the 
D.C. Circuit has declined “to abandon the so-called ‘sliding 
scale’ approach to weighing the four preliminary injunction 
factors” and held that a “party seeking a preliminary 
injunction must make a clear showing that [the] four factors, 
taken together, warrant relief . . . .”  League of Women Voters 
of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).  The Second 
Circuit also has interpreted Winter and Nken as permitting a 
district court to continue a “flexible approach” in granting 
preliminary equitable relief, and that if those cases meant “to 
abrogate the more flexible standard for a preliminary 
injunction, one would expect some reference to the 
considerable history of the flexible standards applied in [the 
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Second Circuit], seven [other] sister circuits, and the Supreme 
Court itself.”  Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special 
Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 37-38 (2d Cir. 
2010).  We find that reasoning persuasive. 
 Third, no test for considering preliminary equitable 
relief should be so rigid as to diminish, let alone disbar, 
discretion.  District courts have the freedom to fashion 
preliminary equitable relief so long as they do so by 
“exercising their sound discretion.”  Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 
(quotation omitted).  Because those courts are on the frontline 
and are much more familiar with the unique facts of a 
particular case, we apply a deferential standard in reviewing 
their decisions on preliminary equitable relief—abuse of 
discretion.  See Campbell Soup Co., 977 F.2d at 91 (quotation 
omitted).  Indeed, “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has 
been the power of the [court] to do equity and to mould each 
decree to the necessities of the particular case.  Flexibility 
rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”  Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (quotations 
omitted). 
 Fourth, disallowing a district court from balancing the 
four factors is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s post-
Winter instruction in Nken that, when evaluating whether 
interim equitable relief is appropriate, “[t]he first two factors 
of the traditional standard are the most critical.”  556 U.S. at 
434.  An Opticians Association of America standard—in 
which all four factors are effectively critical in equal 
recourse—is logically incompatible with Nken’s 
unambiguous holding.  What would be the point of creating 
two gateway factors by placing elevated value on them if all 
are equally imperative?  There would be none.  And to 
require a moving party to prevail on all factors reads out 
balancing when not all factors favor that party.  
 11 
 
 Accordingly, we follow our precedent that a movant 
for preliminary equitable relief must meet the threshold for 
the first two “most critical” factors:  it must demonstrate that 
it can win on the merits (which requires a showing 
significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more 
likely than not3) and that it is more likely than not to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief4.  If 
these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the 
remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion 
                                                          
 3 We do not require at the preliminary stage a more-
likely-than-not showing of success on the merits because a 
“‘likelihood’ [of success on the merits] does not mean more 
likely than not.”  Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 
650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); cf. Nken v. 
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (“It is not enough that the chance 
of success on the merits be better than negligible[,]” and 
“more than a mere ‘possibility’ of relief is required.” 
(quotations omitted)).  Of historical note, not only did 
Transamerican Trailer require nothing more than “a 
reasonable probability of eventual success,” 501 F.2d at 919-
20, cases of our Court before Transamerican Trailer did the 
same.  A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 440 
F.3d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1971) (Seitz, C.J.); Ikirt v. Lee Nat’l 
Corp., 358 F.2d 726, 727 (3d Cir. 1966).  Also of interest is 
that neither of the latter two cases spoke of any showing 
needed for a preliminary injunction beyond a reasonable 
chance of success on the merits and irreparable harm to the 
movant. 
 
 4 For example, the availability of money damages for 
an injury typically will preclude a finding of irreparable harm.  
See, e.g., Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting 
the requested preliminary relief.  In assessing these factors, 
Judge Easterbrook’s observation bears repeating: “How 
strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance 
of the harms: the more net harm an injunction can prevent, 
the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while 
still supporting some preliminary relief.”  Hoosier Energy, 
582 F.3d at 725.                                
 B. The District Court Erred in Its Preliminary  
  Injunction Analysis 
 In considering whether to grant preliminary injunctive 
relief, the District Court observed that Defendants failed to 
produce evidence that “made a clear showing” the ordinance 
was narrowly tailored.  J.A. at 35.  Yet it determined that 
Plaintiffs bore the burden of demonstrating their likelihood of 
success on the merits, and they failed to do so on the scant 
record before it.  Plaintiffs contend that the District Court 
erred in placing this burden on them.  We agree. 
  In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, 
plaintiffs normally bear the burden of demonstrating a 
sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits.  However, in 
First Amendment cases where “the Government bears the 
burden of proof on the ultimate question of [a statute’s] 
constitutionality, [plaintiffs] must be deemed likely to prevail 
[for the purpose of considering a preliminary injunction] 
unless the Government has shown that [plaintiffs’] proposed 
less restrictive alternatives are less effective than [the 
statute].”  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).  This 
is because “the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage 
track the burdens at trial,” and for First Amendment purposes 
they rest with the Government.  Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 546 U.S. 418, 
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429 (2006).  That was not done here, as the District Court 
applied the usual standard of placing the burden on Plaintiffs.  
 Defendants argue that neither party had alerted the 
Court of this narrow exception to the burden-shifting 
framework applied to requests for preliminary injunctions in 
First Amendment cases.  They insist that, had Plaintiffs raised 
this issue, Defendants “would have requested a full hearing” 
to present more fully their case as to the likelihood of success 
on the merits.  Appellees’ Br. 26.  Because, as determined at 
oral argument, neither party was aware of the applicable 
burden-shifting standard in this case, on remand Defendants 
are afforded the opportunity to bear their burden of showing 
that the ordinance is narrowly tailored.  The District Court 
can then consider anew the request for preliminary injunctive 
relief in the clarified context noted above.  We thus vacate 
and remand.  
